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This paper explores empirical aspects of the relation
between supervision and project performance. I focus on
development projects funded by the World Bank and on supervision
done by the World Bank. The World Bank is the preeminent
international development organization both in terms of money
lent and leadership; furthermore, data measuring project
performance and supervision are relatively comprehensive. The
link between supervision and performance is of theoretical
interest because it illuminates one side of World Bank-borrower
interaction and of practical interest because supervision is an
instrument controlled by the World Bank which may improve project
performance.
Data are from 1426 World Bank-funded projects completed
between 1981 and 1991. Analysis of the influence of World Bank
supervision on project performance uses annual supervision and
annual interim performance ratings. The annual updating process
which generates the discrete interim ratings is described by an
ordered probit likelihood function. Maximum likelihood estimates
indicate a positive impact of early supervision on performance;
late supervision has significantly less influence. The
estimation predicts that a significant and persistent increase in
the level of supervision may lead to a gain of several percentage
points in the economic rate of return. Because of the size of
World Bank-funded projects, the potential gains from increasing
supervision far outweigh the costs.1
Introduction
This paper examines supervision and its impact on project
performance using data from the World Bank. Much of development
assistance is via investment projects. The World Bank is the
largest international agency involved in project lending with a
portfolio of 1,850 projects under implementation presenting a
total investment of 300 billion dollars.
1 The importance of
World Bank supervision is clear since it may have a role in
determining the benefits derived from this vast sum of
investment. The primary goal of this paper is to measure the
impact of World Bank supervision and to determine under what
conditions the impact is greatest.
The econometric analysis draws on data from 1426 projects
completed between 1981 and 1991. The performance measures are
discrete ratings generated by World Bank project managers and
evaluators while the supervision measure is World Bank staff
weeks devoted to project supervision. Data are available for
both final performance (one rating per project) and interim
performance (several annual ratings for each project).
2 Use of
the interim measures is preferable because estimation of the
impact of supervision on performance is complicated by a feedback
relation: supervision influences performance which in turn
influences subsequent supervision allocation decisions. A probit
estimation of the relation between supervision and performance
using aggregate ex post measures confounds these causal links.
The relationship it measures could not be interpreted as the
1 Figure derived from World Bank (1993) on the assumption that World Bank
funding accounts for forty-seven percent of total project cost. This is a
nominal figure.
2 General interest in these measures of performance rests on the assumption
that the World Bank’s assessment does not differ dramatically from some
abstract ideal.
Project managers also generate a supervision rating following supervision
missions to the borrowing country. These missions are roughly semi-annual.
The annual rating is most often the same as the last supervision rating but
may differ if opinion has changed since the supervision mission.2
impact of supervision on performance but rather reflects both the
impact of supervision on performance and the impact of
performance on supervision allocation. However, because the
feedback is over time, annual data allow estimation of an ordered
probit model which imposes sufficient structure to isolate the
impact of supervision. The model estimated relates lagged annual
supervision to annual changes in interim performance.
Interim performance, which in principle is continuous, must
be treated as a latent variable because only a discrete
performance rating is observed. Furthermore, changes in
performance rather than levels must be the focus because the
World Bank’s rating process annually updates ratings so that
changes in ratings directly reflect one year changes in the
latent performance variable. This suggests an ordered probit
model for performance where the annual change in performance is
indexed by the annual change in the rating.
The estimated performance equation finds past supervision
positively related to improvement in performance. Supervision is
most effective early in the project and in smaller projects.
Subsidiary calculations suggest that the benefits of supervision
greatly outweigh the costs. Furthermore, the feedback pattern in
the annual equations offers a explanation for the negative
correlation observed between cumulative supervision and final
performance.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the
data, providing summary statistics for ex post and interim
performance ratings and for supervision. Possible problems with
interim ratings, such as incentives for misreporting, are
addressed; ex post and interim ratings are compared.3
Section II investigates the feedback relation between
supervision and performance. A naive performance equation is
estimated with final performance as the dependent variable and
aggregate supervision as an explanatory variable; a negative
estimated coefficient on supervision suggests a correlation with
the error term introduced by aggregation over time. Estimation
of a simple supervision allocation equation reinforces the
feedback explanation.
Section III constructs an econometric model of interim
performance as a function of annual supervision. The relation
between performance and performance ratings motivates an ordered
probit model in terms of differences rather than levels. Other
considerations -- boundary constraints on ratings, a change in
the rating system in 1986, and heteroskedasticity -- are
incorporated in the likelihood function. The change in
performance depends on the previous year’s supervision and
exogenous variables.
Section IV presents estimation results, focussing on
supervision. The results show that early supervision has a much
stronger influence than later supervision and that, when
translated into dollar terms, the marginal benefit of early
supervision is two orders of magnitude greater than the marginal
cost. Finally, a simulation demonstrates the consistency of the
annual interim performance and final performance estimates.
Section V summarizes results and conclusions and suggests
directions for further research.4
I. Data
The central variables in this analysis are measures of
performance and the number of staff weeks of World Bank
supervision. This section describes available performance
measures and provides details on supervision activities. Other
variables relevant to performance are also presented.
I.1 Performance Measures
Two types of performance ratings are used by the World Bank,
final performance ratings and annual interim ratings. Both are
discrete and can be thought of as indices reflecting a latent
variable -- project performance -- which is best thought of as
the expected economic rate of return (calculated using shadow
prices). In some cases, this expected economic rate of return is
calculated explicitly; in other cases, it is not because the
value of benefits is difficult quantify. In the majority of
cases, projects are evaluated on cost effectiveness criteria.
Final Performance Ratings
The Operations Evaluation Department of the World Bank
issues a final performance rating of Satisfactory /
Unsatisfactory (1/0) for each project.
3 Table 1 describes the
final performance ratings for 1426 projects completed between
1981 and 1991.
4 The performance of the sample closely matches
3 Completion ratings are initially given by the operational staff (project
managers); Operations Evaluation either issues this rating as the official
rating or, in a few cases, reverses the rating. Reversals happen almost
exclusively with projects rated satisfactory by the operational staff.
The delay between project completion and rating averages two and one half
years with reports on unsatisfactory projects having the longer delays. As
a result, there has been a surge in the percentage of unsatisfactory
projects recently as the evaluation backlog has been reduced. Since this
backlog was largely created and eliminated in the period studied, it should
not cause a sampling problem.
4 The sample was determined by data availability: final ratings must be
before 1992; at least two consecutive interim ratings must be available
(the interim rating system started in fiscal 1980); supervision data must
exist for the life time of the project (supervision data begin in fiscal5
that of the population in this period: 71.2 % of the projects
were rated satisfactory. A regional break-down exposes some
heterogeneity with projects in the Africa region performing the
worst and those in the Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East
region performing best.
5 Among the ten major types of projects,
technical assistance and agricultural projects had the lowest
proportion of satisfactory outcomes while energy and urban
projects had the highest. Projects with below average size loans
were more likely to fail than those with above average size loans
while projects with below average supervision were less likely to
fail than those with above average supervision. However, these
correlations need not be causal.
6
Interim Performance Ratings
World Bank project managers generate interim performance
ratings on a scale of 1 (good), 2, 3, 4 (bad).
7 The ratings are
collected as part of the Annual Review of Portfolio
Performance
8. Ratings are intended to be relative to initial
project goals and, inter alia, are based on the expected economic
1972); control variables (notably staff weeks of preparation and
macroeconomic indicators) must also be known. In practice, the first two
requirements largely determine the sample.
5 The regional division used in this paper reflects the structure of the
World Bank during this period. Subsequently, these four regions have been
reorganized into six regions.
6 The correlation between the final performance rating and loan amount is
0.02 and between the final performance rating and cumulative supervision is
-0.18.
7 Prior to fiscal 1986, the ratings were from 1 to 3. In fiscal 1986, the
rating 3 was subdivided into 3 and 4 where 3 represents serious problems
being addressed by borrower and 4 represents serious problems not being
addressed by borrower. This change is accounted for in the likelihood
function presented in the appendix. Official guidelines for ARPP ratings
are specified in the March 1989 OD 13.05.
8 ARPP -- formerly ARIS: Annual Report on Implementation and Supervision.6
rate of return.
9 Table 2 describes the annual interim ratings
for the same 1426 projects as in Table 1; the sample size of 7461
annual observations indicates roughly 5 observations per
project.
10 Average interim ratings indicate a relatively high
percentage of satisfactory ratings as 87.8 percent of the
observations are 1 or 2. Regional averages for interim
performance ratings follow a pattern similar to that for final
performance ratings with the top two and the bottom two regions
the same as in Table 1 (though within these groups the order is
reversed). Sectoral ratings differ dramatically, perhaps
reflecting the relative nature of interim ratings. The large loan
/ small loan and high supervision / low supervision dichotomies
follow the same pattern as with final performance: performance
is better in projects with large loans and little supervision.
Note that supervision is lagged by one year since it is the
lagged value which may influence performance. Again, the
negative relation does not indicate a causal direction since
9 Generally, there is no recalculation of an expected economic rate of
return. Hence, this must be interpreted as a rating which reflects the
same factors which would influence the rate of return. The rating also
depends on other variables: development impact, availability of
counterpart funds, procurement performance, etc. This clouds the World
Bank’s notion of economic analysis to some degree. In theory, a rating
based on economic analysis is the best prediction of final performance (the
project’s contribution to social welfare) given all information available.
With this interpretation, the only other dimension is on the World Bank’s
side -- how smoothly the administration is proceeding, independent of its
effects on project performance. However, the evaluation form includes
other ratings related to project performance separately from economic
analysis. For this reason, I use the "overall" rating rather than the
economic rating. The overall rating is also the focus of World Bank
management.
10 This figure is less than the average length of projects in the sample (7.4
years) because some projects began before 1980 and a few projects are
missing data (interim ratings or macroeconomic data for specific years).
The data set includes observations for: 1) projects canceled before
completion (the years before cancellation); 2) projects completed as
scheduled; and 3) projects extended beyond the planned closing date
(including the years after the planned closing date). Note that project
length may be endogenous since the decision to cancel or extend project
implementation depends on performance.7
performance ratings are serially correlated.
11
Table 3 mirrors Table 2 but describes the annual change in
the performance rating and hence the sample is reduced to
6027.
12 For ease of interpretation, I have defined the change
in performance to be positive if performance improves.
Transitions of from -3 to +3 are possible though the extremes are
not observed. The pattern by region and sector is different from
both previous tables. There is no apparent link between loan
size and the change in performance rating but the link between
supervision and change in performance rating is reversed:
projects with more supervision are more likely to show
improvement.
13 Table 3 also describes the depth of the time
series in this unbalanced panel data. Somewhat more than half
the projects would have to be dropped from the sample to have a
moderately long (5+) time series for each project.
Reliability of Ratings
Final performance ratings are likely to be the most reliable
of the measures of project performance. The Operation Evaluation
Department which is ultimately responsible for these ratings is
autonomous and specializes in project evaluation. The department
was founded nearly a decade before the starting date of the data
set; its staff have considerable experience in World Bank
operations prior to joining the department. This autonomy and
experience coupled with relatively clear rating procedures
promotes consistent evaluation. While there may be a general
11 The correlation between interim performance ratings and loan amount is
0.10, between interim performance ratings and annual supervision 0.20 and
between performance and supervision the previous year 0.17. The serial
correlation of interim performance ratings is 0.65.
12 Eight of the 1426 projects are missing one interim performance rating
midway in their time series. First differencing the ratings therefore
reduces the sample by 1434 observations.
13 The correlation between the change in interim performance rating and loan
amount is 0.01 and between the change in interim performance rating and
annual supervision is 0.03. The serial correlation of changes in interim
performance rating is -0.19, driven largely by boundary constraints.8
bias (upward or downward) relative to some other independent
evaluator, there is no reason to suspect bias as a function of
some project characteristic (region, sector, level of
supervision).
However, interim ratings by project managers deserve closer
scrutiny. Three potential sources of bias must be considered:
1) Gaming -- up-grading a portfolio gradually to display
improvement; 2) Shirking -- underestimating or ignoring
performance problems to lighten the supervision workload; and 3)
Ex post justification -- reporting improvement after intensive
supervision to justify expenditure or personal effort.
Possibilities for gaming depend on the career incentives for
project managers. Project managers are generally rotated every
three to five years to promote professional development and
maintain objectivity. One view of the interim rating process is
the "gaming" by a new project manager of the rating system by
giving projects low ratings initially and then gradually
improving them regardless of actual events. However, two factors
operate against this scenario: first, ratings are reviewed by
higher management and country teams so that significant gaming is
discouraged; and second, until recently, the career incentive
system placed significantly more weight on new lending than on
supervision performance. The rarity of gaming is supported by
available data; for projects under implementation in both 1991
and 1992, a dummy variable for a change in Bank project
management was statistically insignificant at the 90 % confidence
level.
14
14 The test was performed using the same form of the likelihood function as is
reported in the appendix. The coefficient was of the expected sign (i.e.,
a change in management is linked with a worsening of the ratings) but was
small and statistically insignificant.9
Details of the institutional arrangements also mitigate
shirking issues in rating. A priori, one might expect a project
manager to underestimate if not ignore performance problems to
lighten the supervision workload. However, a project manager is
involved with the supervision of both his own and other projects.
For his own projects, the project manager coordinates, drawing on
a team of managers and consultants particularly during
supervision missions to the borrowing country. Likewise, he may
assist in the supervision of projects not in his own portfolio.
As a result, the amount of supervision done by a project manager
need not depend on the supervision allocated to his own
portfolio. This breaks the link between a manager’s portfolio’s
performance and his supervision workload and reduces the
incentive to inflate ratings.
15
Finally, one might expect an ex post justification bias
whereby intensive supervision or investment of personal effort
automatically results in improved ratings. However, the
potential for bias is reduced by the number of participants in
the process and the possibility of a management review of the
rating. Furthermore, as we shall see in Section IV, ex post
justification bias is inconsistent with the estimation results.
Interim ratings are likely to be noisier than final ratings.
They are generated by a large, diverse group of people with less
rating experience than the Operations Evaluation staff and their
rating guide-lines are not as clear. However, interim
performance ratings prove to be necessary for assessing the
impact of supervision.
15 However, since the 1987 reorganization, project managers are more likely to
supervise a project alone or with consultants. Given the availability of
consultants, the project manager’s workload is not necessarily effected by
the level of project supervision.10
Comparing Interim and Final Performance Ratings
The simplest method of comparison is to calculate
correlations. The sample correlation between the last interim
and the final performance ratings is 0.34. Another approach is
to examine transition frequencies. Table 4A presents transition
frequencies between interim ratings with the ratings of 3 and 4
combined.
16 No change is the most likely event regardless of
the year or the original rating. The large number of 1’s
relative to 3’s (and 4’s) makes the average change downward (see
Tables 2 and 3) despite the apparent frequency of upward
transitions.
The transition frequency matrices 4B and 4C allow comparison
of interim and final ratings. Table 4B groups interim ratings
into 1,2 and 3,4 for comparison with final ratings.
17 The final
matrix summarizes transitions from the last interim rating
(grouped as 1,2 and 3,4) to the final performance rating.
Initially unsatisfactory projects behave in a similar manner in
both transition matrices but projects rated satisfactory are more
likely to switch to unsatisfactory in the final transition than
in interim transitions. In other words, interim and final
ratings agree as closely as can be expected for projects with an
unsatisfactory interim rating but too many projects receive
satisfactory interim ratings (according to the final performance
measure).
18 This describes the "bias" which may be present in
16 Otherwise, three matrices must be examined: a pre-FY86 3 by 3, an FY86 3
by 4, and a post-FY86 4 by 4. There are no dramatic differences between
these matrices though comparing the different transition frequency matrices
does support the stated split of 3 into 3 and 4: collapsing the 4 by 4
post-FY86 matrix intoa3b y3yields frequencies similar to those in the
pre-FY86 matrix.
17 Table 4B shows transitions for all interim ratings though the matrix
describing only the transition from the second-to-last to the last interim
rating is similar.
18 These observations can be formalized with a generalized likelihood ratio
test. Define Px = Pr(pi,t =1o r2p i,t-1 =1o r2 ) ,Q x = Pr(pi,t =1o r2
p i,t-1 =3o r4 ) ,P y = Pr(pi =1p i,T = 1 or 2), and Qy = Pr(pi =1p i,T =3o r
4) where pi,t is the interim rating for project i in year t, pi,T is the last
interim rating for project i, and pi is the ex post final rating for
project i. The test of the hypothesis H0:P x P y v. H1:P x ¹P y using the11
interim ratings and suggests that upward and downward transitions
in interim ratings may not be symmetrically determined.
I.2 Supervision Data
Data for supervision include all World Bank staff time
recorded for a particular project during its implementation.
19
Supervision encompasses three activities: monitoring, management
advising, and technical assistance. Although no activity break-
down is available, one can distinguish between staff types, the
two main groups being World Bank regular staff and consultants.
Staff tend to do more monitoring and management advising but less
technical work. Conversely, consultants do most of the technical
assistance, some management advising and less monitoring.
20
Summary statistics for the sample of projects considered in
this study for supervision and other continuous independent
variables are presented in Table 5. The first row is for
cumulative supervision over the life of the project. The average
of 81.7 staff weeks reflects an average project implementation
period of 7.4 years. As is illustrated by Figure 1, the maximum
value is a significant outlier: only5%o ft h eobservations
have above 182 staff weeks. On the low end,5%o ft h e
observations have less than 22 staff weeks (Figure 2). Annual
supervision averaged 11.8 staff weeks per project with little
variation in the group average between the first half and the
second half of implementation (although individual projects may
GLRT for difference of means of binomials (Larsen and Marx, p. 380) yields
a p value of 0.0000. The GLRT test of the hypothesis H0:Q x Q y v. H1:Q x
¹Q y yields a p-value of 0.84. These tests confirm that transitions from
unsatisfactory ratings are similar between interim and final ratings while
transitions from satisfactory ratings are significantly different.
19 The supervision variable excludes time which is not allocated to a specific
project and time spent on preparation of the project completion report.
The first cannot be allocated consistently and the second is functionally
different from supervision.
20 The data do not allow one to distinguish between long-term and short-term
consultants. Long-term consultants perform much the same tasks as regular
staff; it is the short-term consultants who are generally contracted to
carry-out more specialized technical tasks.12
have considerable variation).
21 The upper5%o fprojects have
30 or more staff weeks of supervision per year in the early
period and 28 in the second period. The lower figures are 1.8
and 1.0 staff weeks. See Figures 3 and 4 for the distribution of
annual supervision.
I.3 Other Variables
Other control variables included in the estimations are:
administrative region, economic sector, loan amount, World Bank
contribution to project preparation, macroeconomic indicators,
and institutional variables. The administrative regions are:
Africa; Asia; Europe, Middle East and North Africa; and, Latin
America and the Caribbean. These correspond to the major
operational divisions of the World Bank during the period studied
and may capture both administrative / organizational and
geographic differences. Economic sectors broadly indicate the
type of project.
22 Loan amount is in 1990 US dollars where the
conversion from nominal figures uses a US GDP deflator and is
based on the third year after board approval, roughly the middle
of the project.
23 The loan amount is typically a fraction of
the total project cost. Preparation data are in staff weeks and
are intended to capture the complexity of the project relative to
borrower capabilities. Macroeconomic indicators reflect the
economic environment external to the project which may influence
21 Note that supervision is lagged by one year so that supervision in the
final year (typically only a fraction of the year) is excluded.
This figure is not representative of current levels as supervision has
increase significantly in recent years.
22 Sectors are listed in Table 1. I follow divisions established by the
Operations Evaluation Department except: 1) Sectoral Adjustment Loans have
been grouped with Structural Adjustment Loans due to the small number of
the former; 2) some Technical Assistance projects and Sectoral Adjustment
Loans which were included as subsectors of other sectors were reclassified;
3) Disaster Relief and Multisector projects have been pooled as "Other"
because of their small numbers.
23 I use the first year of projects with a planned length of two years, the
second year for projects with planned length of 3 or 4 years, and the third
year for all other projects.13
performance via relative prices or general externalities. They
may also proxy for unobservables such as differences in human
capital, "level of development," or the influence of government
policy. Institutional variables are constructed by
administrative department and measure the availability of
supervision resources and the competing demands for these
resources. These may be taken as a rough measure of the
opportunity cost of supervision.14
II. The Role of Supervision
With the data available, we can either examine the relation
between final performance and cumulative supervision or interim
performance and annual supervision. A priori, the aggregate
model is more appealing since final performance ratings may be
somewhat more consistent. However, if the World Bank allocates
supervision based on past performance, then cumulative
supervision will be correlated with the error term in an final
performance equation and the estimated supervision coefficient
will not have a meaningful interpretation as it confounds the
impact of supervision on performance with the allocation of
supervision.
This section uses a simple model of annual performance and
annual supervision allocation to demonstrate the potential
endogeneity of cumulative supervision in a final performance
equation. Estimation of the final performance equation results
in a negative coefficient on cumulative supervision, apparently
due to this endogeneity. Finally, estimation of an annual
supervision allocation function confirms the importance of past
performance in the allocation of supervision. These results
point to estimating the performance equation on an annual level,
the task pursue in the next section.
If the World Bank views supervision as a means of improving
performance, the allocation of supervision to a project in a
given year may depend on the project’s performance. In
particular, one would expect the World Bank to allocate more
supervision to problem projects than to exemplary ones. If
performance responds to supervision, the result is a feedback
relationship between supervision and performance. According to
this story, estimating the relation between final performance
ratings and cumulative supervision suffers from an endogeneity
problem since both final performance and cumulative supervision
depend on interim performance. The coefficient on supervision15
combines the effects of supervision on performance with the
impact of the allocation mechanism.
A simple model demonstrates this point. The model has two
equations, an annual change in performance equation and an annual
supervision allocation equation. From these I derive an
aggregate equation relating final performance to cumulative
supervision and demonstrate that cumulative supervision is
correlated with the error term.
Let P
*
i,t be the performance of project i at time t (where P
*
i,t
increases as performance improves), Si,t the number of staff weeks
of supervision of project i in year t, Xi,t a vector of fixed or
exogenous factors influencing project performance, and Yi,t a
vector of fixed or exogenous factors influencing the allocation
of supervision. Projects start at t=1 with an exogenously given
initial performance, P
*
i,1. Project i continues for Ti periods: t










i,t = aSi,t-1 + X¢ i,tb + ui,t (2.1)
Si,t = gP
*
i,t + Y¢ i,tl + ni,t (2.2)






and E(un¢)=0 (i.e., uncorrelated errors)
I specify the equation in terms of the change in
performance, anticipating the results of the next section. The
relevant supervision variable is supervision in year t 1 since
the dependent variable is the change between years t 1 and t.
Why annual and not cumulative past supervision? Performance in
any given year depends on cumulative past supervision (among
other things) because physical and institutional project
components change slowly (barring fires, wars, etc.) and hence
performance does not "start anew" each period but rather depends
on past events. Therefore, performance depends on cumulative16
supervision and the change in performance depends on the change
in cumulative supervision, i.e., the annual change in performance
depends on annual supervision:
24





Returning to equations (2.1) and (2.2), we can derive an










i,Ti-1 + aSi,Ti-1 + X¢ i,Tib + ui,Ti
=P
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i,1 + aSi + X¢ ib + ui (2.3)
Where Si, Xi, and ui are the summations over t. Although final
performance is a function of cumulative supervision (Si),
cumulative supervision is correlated with the error term. To see
this, we can calculate the covariance between Si and ui, starting
with the individual components:
E(Si,tui,r) = E([gP
*
i,t + Y¢ i,tl + ni,t]ui,r)
=E ( g P
*
i,tui,r)
=E ( g [P
*







24 One could argue that there are lagged effects of supervision so that more
than one supervision term should be included. This is equivalent to a
weighted average specification for cumulative supervision in a performance
equation. However, additional supervision terms turn out to be
insignificant.17



















Solving this recursively and summing over r and t gives
E(Siui)= - ( s
2
u / a )*(Ti-1+[1-(1+ga)
Ti-1]/ga) ga¹0
which is generally non-zero so that Si is correlated with the
error term.
25 The impact of this correlation is clear in the
following estimation of equation (2.3).





i,Ti = aSi + b1 + b2RD1i ++ b 4 RD3i + b5SD1i + + (2.5)
b14SD10i +b15Li + b16PRi + b17Gi + b18Oi + ui
ui i.d. N(0, Tis
2
u)
25 See Appendix 2 for a derivation of this result.
26 Note that P*
i,1 is omitted from (2.5). This introduces a problem since Si,1




i,1 is unobservable. One solution is to use
the first interim rating as a measure of Pi,1. This would introduce a
conceptual complication (interim and final ratings are not directly
comparable) and a technical complication (including an indicator in place
of the latent variable). For these reasons, P
*




Si: cumulative number of staff weeks of World Bank
supervision on project i.
RD1i to RD3i: region dummies (Africa omitted).
SD1i to SD10i: sector dummies (Agriculture omitted).
Li: loan amount for project i in US$.
PRi: number of staff weeks of World Bank preparation
for project i.
Gi: average growth rate of GDP per capita for country
in which project i takes place.
Oi: average index of openness for the country in
which project i takes place:
(Exports+Imports)/GDP.
As noted in the previous section, the Operations Evaluation
Department issues a satisfactory or unsatisfactory rating based
in part on the expected economic rate of return (performance); if
it is above 10 %, the project is generally rated satisfactory.
28
Since the specification includes a constant, the critical value
can be set to 0 without loss of generality and the performance
rating is defined as an index:






With the additional assumption that ui,t are normally
distributed, this results in the standard probit likelihood
function except that ui are heteroskedastic with variance Tis
2
u.
Heteroskedasticity follows from the derivation of Equation (2.3).
Since a project’s performance is influenced by random shocks, the
27 The importance of region, sector, project size, and macroeconomic variables
is suggested by previous research on the expected economic rate of return.
See Kaufmann (1991), Kaufmann and Wang (1991), OED (1988) and (1990), Pohl
and Mihaljek (1992), and Wallace and Silver (1991).
28 This subsumes two other issues: reported values of the expected economic
rate of return and projects with no reported expected economic rate of
return value. In the case where inflated values are reported, I assume
that the rating is based on the true value (implicitly). For projects with
no economic rate of return calculated, I assume that the evaluation process
used has a direct mapping into economic rates of return. If the evaluation
method is consistent but does not map directly into the 10 percent expected
economic rate of return rule, the estimation method is still valid with the
caveat that interpretation of the sectoral constant is unclear.19
longer the project has been running, the more random shocks it
may have received and the greater its unexplained variance will
be. The correction is to divide Si and Xi by the square-root of
Ti (where s
2
u is assumed to be 1).
Maximum likelihood estimates are presented in Table 6 and
Figure 5. The striking feature is the negative coefficient
estimate for cumulative supervision (equivalently, the downward
sloping curve in Figure 5). Over the typical range in the data
(from minus one to plus one standard deviation from the mean
level of supervision, 26 to 138 staff weeks -- see Figures 1 and
2), the predicted probability of success ranges from 84 percent
for low supervision to 61 percent for high supervision. Equally
striking though not evident in the table is the robustness of the
negative relation.
29
The intuition behind this negative relation follows directly
from the endogeneity argument. If project performance is low, a
project will receive added supervision, making it a "high"
supervision project. If this extra supervision is only partly
successful in raising project performance, many highly supervised
projects will still have major problems at project completion.
Conversely, if project performance is high, a project will
receive less supervision, making it a "low" supervision project.
Performance may deteriorate somewhat (or not improve as much as
if supervision were high) but is likely to remain above the
threshold level.
In general, when supervision allocation is based on
performance, the correlation between cumulative supervision and
final performance will reflect a combination of the allocation
rule and the influence of supervision on performance. If
supervision allocation only responds weakly to performance, the
correlation will be positive although it will understate the true
29 The negative relation is robust to changes in the functional form, changes
in the specification of supervision, excluding the highest and lowest
twenty percent of supervision values, omitting the heteroskedasticity
correction, etc.20
impact of supervision on performance. If the allocation rule
roughly matches the impact of supervision, there may appear to be
no aggregate relation between the two. Finally, if supervision
allocation is more responsive to performance than performance is
to supervision, the correlation will be negative. This last case
may explain the probit results.
Supervision Allocation Equation:
The above interpretation of the probit results and the
endogeneity argument are based on the assumption that supervision
is allocated according to performance. This proposition can be
investigated by estimating the supervision allocation equation
(2.2). However, in the estimated equation, supervision is
allocated on the basis of interim ratings rather than actual
performance. Because of the timing of World Bank supervision
allocation decisions and of interim performance ratings, ratings
in years t-1 and t may influence supervision in year t. Again,
the simplest model will serve our purposes.
30
Expanding equation (2.2)
Si,t = g0 + g1P2i,t + g2P34i,t + g3P3i,t + g4P4i,t + (2.6)
g5P2i,t-1 + g6P34i,t-1 + g7P3i,t-1 + g8P4i,t-1 +
l1(t/T0i)+l 2 (t/T0i)
2 + l3RD1i ++ l 5 RD3i +
l6SD1i ++ l 15SD10i + l16Li + l17Li
2 + l18PRi +
l19Gi,t + l20GRi,t-1 + l21Oi,t-1 + l22Z1i,t + l23Z2i,t +
l24Z3i,t + l25Z4i,t + l26Z4i,t
2 + l27Z5i,t + ni,t
30 Since the method of estimation is least squares, it is a minor issue
whether we view supervision as a function of performance ratings or of
actual performance. In the latter case, ratings proxy for actual
performance. I include both the previous year’s and the current year’s
rating because of the timing of events. Supervision budgeting happens at
the same time as ratings are collected (Pt-1) while the actual amount of
supervision may differ from the budgeted level, presumably based on new




t in equation (2.2) would
complicate but not fundamentally alter the endogeneity result.21
where
P2i,t: 1 if Pi,t = 2, 0 otherwise.
P34i,t: 1 if Pi,t = 3 and year < 86, 0 otherwise.
P3i,t: 1 if Pi,t = 3 and year ³ 86, 0 otherwise.
P4i,t: 1 if Pi,t = 4, 0 otherwise.
t/T0i: fraction of project i’s planned implementation
period completed. This may be greater than 1
if the project finishes behind schedule.
31
GRi,t-1: GDP/capita in 1987 US $
Z1i,t to Z5i,t: institutional variables. Z1i,t to Z3i,t measure
the availability of staff and consultants for
supervision within the department managing
project i in period t and Z4i,t to Z5i,t measure
the supervision workload of the department.
See (2.5) for other variables.
Project performance ratings are represented by dummy
variables to allow flexibility. Other variables which influence
the allocation of supervision, such as phase of implementation
(timing), region, sector, loan amount, project complexity
relative to borrower capabilities (proxied by preparation),
macroeconomic conditions, and the opportunity cost of supervision
(measured by institutional variables), are included as
controls.
32
Table 7 and Figure 6 present regression results. Evidently,
interim performance is a major consideration in the allocation of
supervision; Figure 6 illustrates that a project with
consistently poor ratings (3,3) receives 50 % more supervision
than a model project (1,1). However, projects with major
problems which are not being corrected by the borrower (4,4)
receive less supervision possibly because some of them are
31 Although t/Ti (the fraction of the actual implementation period completed)
may seem like a more appropriate measure of implementation progress, Ti
must be treated as endogenous.
32 Institutional factors are intended to reflect internal World Bank
conditions which may affect the allocation of supervision. The variables
are constructed by department since supervision resources may be
transferred more easily within departments than between them. Variables
measure the total amount of supervision available to the department and the
number of other projects competing for that supervision. The number of




These results support the conjecture that the allocation of
supervision to problem projects contributes to the negative
coefficient on cumulative supervision in the final performance
equation. The estimation with final performance fails to
identify the impact of supervision on performance because it does
not control for the influence of prior performance on supervision
allocation. To include this consideration, interim performance
data are needed. The next section introduces a statistical model
for estimating the impact of annual supervision on performance
using interim ratings.
33 Figure 6 summarizes the regression coefficients. The x-axis is the sum of
Pt-1 and Pt. The y-axis is the sum of the two coefficients on these dummy
variables. When more than one combination of ratings yields the same x-
value (e.g., 4: 1+3, 2+2, 3+1), the average of the relevant coefficient
sums is plotted.
The responsiveness of supervision allocation to performance varies by
administrative region with the Asia department being the most responsive
and Africa the least.23
III. Annual Performance Equation
This section develops a statistical model relating annual
supervision to interim performance. As with final performance,
interim performance is not directly observed but is measured by a
discrete rating. Therefore, the key issue in constructing the
likelihood function is the manner in which ratings reflect
performance. When examining final performance, a threshold model
linking performance to ratings is straightforward. However, with
a sequence of interim ratings, a number of models are reasonable
ex ante. The starting point is a general first order markov
process but, for reasons of efficiency and interpretation, I
consider two reasonable restrictions on the rating process termed
"recalculate from scratch" and "annual update." Institutional
and empirical evidence, however, support annual update more
strongly. Other issues -- boundary constraints on the rating
scale, a change in the rating system in 1986, and the covariance
structure of the data -- also shape the likelihood function. The
resulting model is a restricted first order markov process.
Model of Rating
Since interim performance ratings are made annually and --
at least in theory -- reflect the expected performance of a
project conditional on available information, rating can be
viewed as a conditional first order markov process. A transition
probability matrix {qAB} gives the probability of a rating B in
year t, conditional on having a rating A in year t-1 and other




1q 11 q12 q13 q14
2 q21 q22 q23 q24
3 q31 q32 q33 q34
4 q41 q42 q43 q44
Pt-1
The only necessary restrictions are that each element is non-
negative and that each row sums to 1. The conditional
probabilities in each row can be estimated by ordered probit if
we assume that ratings are ordered, that conditioning variables
enter as a linear combination, and that there is a standard
normal error term.
While an unrestricted first order markov process has the
advantage of generality, it has the accompanying disadvantages of
unclear interpretation and efficient loss relative to a model
with correct restrictions imposed. An appropriate across row
restriction may eliminate these problems. The interpretation
issue centers on the meaning of estimating four different rating
processes. The World Bank does not provide four different rating
procedures as is implied by separate estimation of each row.
While we may want to let some parameters depend on the previous
performance rating (i.e., allow them the vary by row), it is
doubtful that there is a useful interpretation of a model in
which all the parameters vary.
The second consideration is efficiency. Row by row
estimation means that only within row variation in the dependent
variables contributes to the estimation of parameters. Any
information in between row variance is lost. This is a
particularly serious issue when there is a strong systematic
difference across rows. As demonstrated by supervision
allocation equation (2.6), the level of supervision has a strong
dependence on the performance rating and hence its mean does25
systematically by row.
Other efficiency concerns have to do with the number of
parameters as compared with the number of positive observations
in rows 3 and 4. Row by row estimation would require grouping
these categories because of the number of parameters to be
estimated and the lack of positive observations on certain dummy
variables within these groups. Even when grouped, 3 and 4 still
contain relatively few observations during the early period of
project implementation. One of the most interesting questions is
how the impact of supervision varies between the early and late
stages of implementation; this issue could not be address for
these two rows.
These issues of interpretation and efficiency argue for
imposing some reasonable across row restriction. The appropriate
source for such a restriction is World Bank rating procedure. I
consider two rating models which imply across row restrictions,
the "recalculate from scratch" model and the "annual update"
model.
The recalculate from scratch model is a threshold model of
rating where the latent variable is project performance and the
observable index is the interim performance rating. In this
model, each year the World Bank evaluator observes or calculates
the project’s performance and then reports "1" if it is above a
fixed threshold P1, "2" if it is above a fixed threshold P2, etc.
Since the evaluator recalculates performance from scratch each
year, the previous rating does not enter into the determination
of the new rating. Returning to the transition probability
matrix, this means that, conditional on Xi,t, the probability of a
rating B does not depend on the previous rating A: qAB =q B .
Thus, all rows of the transition probability matrix are the same.26
Pt
1234
1q 1 q 2 q 3 q 4
2q 1 q 2 q 3 q 4
3q 1 q 2 q 3 q 4
4q 1 q 2 q 3 q 4
P t-1
The annual update model follows from a different description
of the rating process. In all but the first year of
implementation, the previous rating (Pt-1) is known. After the
first year, the project manager may simply calculate the change
in performance since the last rating and update the rating only
if there has been a large change. This is again a threshold
model but in terms of changes rather than levels. The
restriction for the transition probability matrix is that qAB =
qA-B. Thus, for any top-left to bottom-right diagonal of the




1q 0 q -1 q-2 q-3
2 q1 q0 q-1 q-2
3 q2 q1 q0 q-1
4 q3 q2 q1 q0
Pt-1
Examining the different implications of the two models in a
few scenarios provides more intuition than eye-balling transition
matrices. In the recalculate from scratch model, the interim
performance rating is a direct indicator of the latent
performance variable. We can think of each rating (4,3,2,1) as
34 Recall that the change in rating (DPi,t) has been defined so that positive
values indicate improvement: DPi,t =P i,t-1 -P i,t. This corresponds to
having qAB=qA-B rather than qB-A. Only rating changes of -2 to 2 are observed
in the sample; I set q3=q-3=0 henceforth.27
corresponding to an interval along a "performance" number line







A change in the rating in year t occurs when performance in years
t-1 and t fall above and below a threshold value. If the two
performance values closely straddle the threshold (e.g., A and
B), a fairly small year to year change in performance will
trigger a change the rating. However, the two may be farther
apart but within the same interval and hence the rating remains
unchanged (e.g., B and C). This model indicates that inferences
about the general level of performance are possible but those
about changes in performance may be misleading.
The annual update model has the exact opposite
characteristic. A change in the interim performance rating
indicates a sizeable one-year change in the latent performance
variable. Each change in rating (-2,-1,0,1,2) corresponds to an
interval along an "annual change in performance" number line with
the numbers DP-2, DP-1, DP1 and DP2 indicating the boundaries
between intervals:




D AB DBC DAC
A change in the rating in year t occurs when the difference
between performance in years t-1 and t exceeds a threshold (e.g.,
DAC). Thus, a fairly small year to year change in performance
will never trigger a change the rating (e.g., DAB). However, a
series of gradual changes in performance will not be reflected in
the rating if none of the annual changes are individually large28
enough to trigger a rating change (e.g., DAB, DBC). This model
indicates that inferences about the general level of performance
and possibly cumulative changes may be inaccurate but those about
annual changes in performance are possible.
The choice between these alternative models should be based
on rating procedures and empirical evidence. Fortunately, both
criteria agree, favoring the annual update model. On the
procedural side, the main evidence is from Form 590, the computer
form for interim evaluation reports. This form can be
characterized as an update: the previous project performance
rating is provided next to the blank for the current rating;
other fields likewise display previous values next to blanks for
current values; and several comment fields request revisions and
updates since the last filing of the form. In addition, World
Bank staff in the Operations Policy Review Department describe
the rating process as one of updating. That is, evaluators
consider how much the project’s performance has changed since the
previous rating and then update the previous rating accordingly.
The comparison of interim and final rating transitions
presented in Section I and Table 4 also supports the annual
update model. Recall that downward interim transitions are
infrequent relative to downward final transitions while upward
interim and final transitions occur with the same frequency.
Since the annual update model allows upward thresholds to be
asymmetric with downward thresholds, this asymmetry in
frequencies could be the result of the location of thresholds.
If the threshold for improving the rating is closer to 0 than
that for worsening the rating, ratings will tend to go up but not
down:





DP=0 instead of -1
If DP1 is at the "right" value but DP-1 is "too low," then upward29
transitions occur with the right frequency and downward
transitions occur too infrequently.
35
This asymmetry cannot be explained with the recalculate from
scratch model. The division between satisfactory and
unsatisfactory depends on P2, the threshold between the ratings 2
and 3. If P2 is too low, then downward transitions are too
infrequent but upward transition are too frequent. Conversely,
if P2 is too high, then downward transitions are too frequent and
upward transitions are too infrequent. Neither yields the
observed asymmetric pattern.
This evidence supports selecting the annual update model as
an identifying restriction. Since the annual change in
performance is indexed by the annual change in rating, estimation
is by ordered probit. However, additional considerations arise
because the scale is the change in the observed rating.
Boundary Constraints:
Because the annual update model uses the change in the
rating as the index variable, boundary constraints must be
considered. For example, if Pi,t-1 = 1, then DPi,t may be 0, 1 or
2 but not 1 or 2. Therefore, the relation between the latent
variable DP
*
i,t and the index variable DPi,t depends on Pi,t-1.
Continuing with the example, if the boundary constraint is not
binding, we have:
Pr(DPi,t=0) = Pr(DP-1 £D P
*
i,t < DP1)=q 0
Pr(DPi,t=1) = Pr(DP1 £D P
*
i,t < DP2)=q 1
Pr(DPi,t=2) = Pr(DP2 £D P
*
i,t)= q 2
However, if Pi,t-1 =1 ,D P i,t cannot be 1 or 2 regardless of the
value of DP
*
i,t so that the appropriate probability statement is
Pr(DPi,t=0 DPi,t-1=1) = Pr(DP-1 £D P
*
i,t)= q 0 +q1+q2
35 That is, it takes a lot of bad news to lower a rating but only a little
good news to improve it.30





1 q 0 +q1+q2 q-1 q-2 0
2 q1+q2 q0 q-1 q-2
3 q2 q1 q0 q-1+q-2
4 0 q2 q1 q0+q-1+q-2
These probabilities are the basis for constructing the likelihood
function in Appendix 1.
There are three noteworthy points about this restriction on
the likelihood function. First, this is once again a first order
markov process since the probability of transition depends
explicitly on both states rather than simply on their difference.
However, estimation is not row by row since all estimated
coefficients are the same across rows. With 5 q’s and 14 cells
in the matrix, there is still enough overlap that each qA-B is
identified. Second, conditional on the annual update model, the
imposed boundary constraints are logically valid restrictions and
hence improve the efficiency of estimation. Finally, boundary
constraints avoid a bias in estimation.
Consider a project with a rating of 1 in year t-1 which,
according to the supervision allocation function estimated in
Section II, will receive relatively little supervision. If the
project improves in spite of the low supervision (e.g., if
supervision does not matter), no change will be observed because
1 is the highest rating. If the project’s performance
deteriorates sufficiently, a change of -1 or -2 may be observed.
The result is that projects with a rating of 1 will generally be
allocated less supervision while, for unrelated reasons,
improvement is never observed. Symmetrically, projects with a
rating of 4 will generally be allocated more supervision while
deterioration is never observed. If these boundary effects are31
not incorporated in the likelihood function, the mechanism for
allocating supervision will introduce an upward bias in the
estimated coefficient on supervision. Ironically, supervision
allocation can introduce a downward bias in the final performance
estimation and an upward bias in the interim performance
estimation.
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Modification of the Rating Scale:
Prior to 1986, the rating scale was from 1 to 3, where
projects rateda1o r2were considered satisfactory while
projects with a 3 were unsatisfactory. The new scale left 1 and
2 unaffected but subdivided 3 into 3 and 4.
37 Because this
change just divided an existing category, modelling it is quite
straightforward -- all that is required is to modify what ratings
changes are possible from each state. Prior to 1986, the
transition probability matrix is just the 3 by 3 sub-matrix
covering 1 to 3 with the probabilities from the fourth column
added to the third column.
38
Heteroskedasticity:
There are several reasons to suppose that the unexplained
variance of the ratings may be related to observables. Variance
may differ by region since these regions correspond to different
administrative departments within the World Bank which may have
slightly different procedures. In addition, certain parts of the
world are be more volatile; this volatility may carry over to
project performance. Variability may also depend on the type of
project and thus depend on the sectoral dummies. It is
36 This reinforces the usual arguments against a linear expectation model.
37 Analysis of transition frequency matrices for pre-86 and post-86 ratings
support the stated change: it does appear that 3 was subdivided and that
the definitions of 1 and 2 were unaffected.
38 The only subtlety is that changes from 3 in FY85 to 4 in FY86 may be
spurious (i.e., there may be no change in performance). Therefore, a third
matrix just for FY86 adds the q34 element to the q33 element, replacing q34
with 0.32
conceivable that larger projects are less volatile than smaller
ones or that macroeconomic changes are linked with variability in
performance (e.g., high inflation might be good for some projects
but bad for others). We might also think that the performance of
heavily supervised projects is known more precisely and hence
that the ratings of these projects are less prone to
fluctuations.
A likelihood ratio test for heteroskedasticity compared a
homoskedastic specification with a heteroskedastic specification
of s
2(Xi,t) varying additively with regional and sectoral dummies
and multiplicatively with the continuous independent variables.
Heteroskedasticity is confirmed, though successive tests reveal
heteroskedasticity by region and sector only. Thus,
heteroskedasticity can be represented as s
2(Xi) since the
relevant variables are time-invariant.
39
Other Specification Issues
Since the data set is a (unbalanced) panel, a fixed or
random effect model was considered. Including a project fixed
effect would capture any project-specific element of the change
in performance. However, several time-invariant variables are
included (region, sector, loan amount, preparation); the
influence of these factors could not be estimated in a fixed
effects model. Furthermore, the estimation procedure itself is
problematic, both computationally and theoretically. Since the
likelihood function is based on probit, no space or time saving
algorithm is available. Although 175 projects which have only
one observation on DP would drop from the sample, 1251 additional
parameters would have to be estimated. More importantly, large
sample consistency results do not apply to estimation of fixed
effects parameters since Ti is small (ranging from 2 to 11). If
the model can be transformed to one which is independent of these
incidental parameters (e.g., first differencing in a linear
39 Several functional forms were investigated; all had similar results.33
model), consistent estimators of the remaining parameters may
exist; however, no such transformation is known for the probit
likelihood function.
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These considerations together with the intention of
estimating population parameters rather than simply fitting the
given sample argue for a random effects approach rather than
fixed effects. However, with a random effects model, the
covariance matrix ceases to be diagonal since there are non-zero
covariances between observations within each project. The
resulting likelihood function requires an additional integration
over the distribution of the random effect.
Likewise, testing for other forms of autocorrelation, while
theoretically desirable, lead to computational problems. The
usual test statistics (Wald, Likelihood Ratio, and Lagrange
Multiplier) are as computationally complex as the heterosketastic
model. This is obvious in the case of the Wald and Likelihood
Ratio statistics since they involve estimation under the
alternative but is also true of the Lagrange Multiplier
statistic. The score and the information matrix involve two
integrations for adjacent error terms and thus the statistic does
not simplify into the usual T*R
2 from a regression of quantities
readily obtainable from estimation under the null.
A more tractable approach in this situation is to follow the
suggestion of Gourieroux, Monfort, Renault, and Trognon (1987)
who provide a method for constructing simulated residuals to
which standard testing techniques for continuous data can be
applied. They prove that this procedure results in a
conservative test. Correlograms (Figures 7 and 8) present
autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations computed using
simulated residuals from the estimation of Table 8. There is
some evidence of negative autocorrelation but no identifiable
40 For a discussion of the problems of a probit fixed effects model, see Hsiao
(1986), pp. 161-164 or Maddala (1987), pp. 315-317. Although Hsiao notes a
1981 Monte Carlo study by Heckman which suggests the bias may be small, all
the evidence taken together makes a random effects model more attractive
than a biased fixed effects procedure.34
pattern.
41 Given the limited extent of the time series
available, I have not pursued estimation of the covariance
structure.
Latent Variable Specification:
The annual change in performance equation estimated is a
refinement of equation (2.2):
DP
*
i,t = a1(Si,t-1 H1i,t)+a 2 (Si,t-1 H2i,t) + (3.1)
a3(Si,t-1
2 H1i,t)+a 4 (Si,t-1
2 H2i,t)+
a 5 (Li Si,t-1 H1i,t)+a 6 (Li Si,t-1 H2i,t)+
b 1 H2i,t + b2(t/T0i H1i,t)+b 3 (t/T0i H2i,t)+
b 4 ((t/T0i)
2 H1i,t)+b 5 ((t/T0i)
2 H2i,t)+
b 6 RD1i ++ b 8 RD3i + b9SD1i ++ b 18SD10i +






u(Xi)=1+q 1 RD1i ++ q 3 RD3i + q4SD1i ++ q 13SD10i
where
Si,t-1: number of staff weeks of World Bank
supervision in year t-1 on project i.
H1i,t: = 1 if t/T0i < .5, 0 otherwise.
H2i,t: = 1 if t/T0i ³ .5, 0 otherwise.
See (2.5) and (2.6) for other variables.
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As before, the central issue is the role of supervision. To
allow for the possibility that the impact of supervision varies
over the life of the project, supervision is divided into early
and late supervision. This division is a simple method for
capturing any time variation in the impact of supervision. To
41 Random effects should result in positive autocorrelation; smoothing ratings
(delaying bad news) should result in positive autocorrelation; gaming by
raters is ambiguous in its effect.
42 Period t-1 to t growth is used rather than t-2 to t-1 because performance
data are by fiscal year while macro data are by calendar year.35
avoid mistaking pure time differences in the evolution of
performance for variations in supervision’s influence over time,
other time variables are also included. Hence, the early/late
division of supervision should capture only real differences in
the impact of supervision on performance.
Interaction terms for supervision and loan amount are
included. The effect of supervision on performance may vary by
region, type of project, project size, level of preparation, etc.
All these interaction terms were considered but, for simplicity,
I include only significant interaction terms.
Other variables included are suggested by previous research
on the expected economic rate of return. The likelihood function
is given in Appendix 1.36
IV. Estimation Results
This section presents results from maximum likelihood
estimation of the annual change in performance equation specified
in Section III. Implications of the estimates are explored with
simulations. Tables 8 to 10 and Figures 9 to 11 present the
results of the estimation and simulations. I focus primarily on
the impact of supervision. As expected this impact is positive
though small in the sense that a single week of supervision is
unlikely to "turn-around" a troubled project. However, given the
size of World Bank funded projects (an average total cost of over
100 million 1990 US dollars), small improvements in performance
are large improvements in dollars terms and hence supervision
appears to be very worthwhile.
IV.1 Coefficients
Table 8 presents the estimation results. The impact of
supervision done during the first half of the project’s planned
implementation period is positive and significant.
43 The impact
of later supervision (during the second half) is two orders of
magnitude less than that of early supervision as measured by the
expectation derivative.
44 Thus, during the first half of
implementation, project performance was more likely to improve if
previous supervision was high (all else being equal) while later
on supervision has considerably less influence.
Figure 9 depicts the impact of early supervision on
performance. As in Figure 5, each point represents the expected
43 A likelihood ratio test of the joint hypothesis H0: a1 = a2 = a3 = a4 = a5 =
a6 = 0 against the alternative H1: at least one of the coefficients is
not 0, compares the LR statistic of 19.3 against a c2
6, yielding a p-value
of 0.004. Thus, the hypothesis that the previous year’s supervision is
unrelated to the subsequent change in performance can be rejected at the 95
% confidence level.
44 The likelihood ratio test of the joint hypothesis H0: a2 = a4 = a6 =0
against the alternative H1: at least one of the coefficients is not 0,
compares the LR statistic of 8.26 with a c
2
3 yielding a p-value of 0.041.
Therefore, the hypothesis that late supervision has no impact on
performance can be rejected at the 95 % confidence level.37
change in performance for a particular observation while the
curve is the expected change in performance for a typical project
as a function of the level of supervision in the previous
year.
45 The graph clearly shows the positive relation between
supervision and performance. As with any simulation, the extreme
values must be interpreted with caution. For example, we would
reasonably expect performance to diminish much more than
indicated if a project continually received no supervision since
this would indicate no checking of disbursement requests or
validation of expenses.
The interaction of supervision with other variables was
investigated; only the interaction with loan amount was
significant. The negative estimated coefficients for these
interaction terms in Table 8 indicate that the marginal impact of
supervision falls as the size of the loan increases: more
supervision is required to achieve a given increase in
performance for a project with a large loan than for a project
with a small loan. If two projects are similar except that one
has a loan of 100 million dollars and the other a loan of 10
million dollars, the larger project requires 22 staff weeks of
supervision per year in the early period to have the same
influence as 12 staff weeks in the smaller project.
46
Interaction terms between supervision and region / sector
variables are not reported because they are insignificant. This
implies that the influence of supervision is similar even across
very dissimilar projects in varied environments. One
45 The typical project is one with variables set equal to mean values as in
Table 9. See the discussion of Table 9 below for details.
46 This figure is derived using the estimates in Table 8 and the quadratic
formula. The level of supervision S2 makes the contribution of supervision
in the two cases the same if it solves:
ˆ a1S1 ˆ a3S
2
1 ˆ a5L1S1 ˆ a1S2 ˆ a3S
2
2 ˆ a5L2S2
where S1 = 12, L1 = 10, L2 = 100, and a’s are from Table 8. This does not
include the direct effect of a larger loan; if instead we equate the
expected change performance in the two projects, then
S2 = 11.2.38
interpretation of this homogeneity is that the activity that
supervision measures (e.g., monitoring) is similar across regions
and sectors.
The remaining explanatory variables are ex ante project
characteristics (region, sector, loan amount, and preparation)
and macroeconomic conditions. These variables were allowed to
enter both the conditional mean and variance; however, only
region and sector dummy variables were significant in the
variance.
The expected change in performance is relatively uniform
across regions (with other factors held constant) indicating that
observed regional differences in performance ratings are due to
initial conditions or systematic differences in other covariates.
However, the estimated variances in Asia and Europe, Middle East
and North Africa are lower. Either performance changes in the
these regions were more predictable than in other regions or the
rating process was somewhat more consistent in these departments
than in other departments of the World Bank. As noted above, the
influence of supervision was uniform across regions.
There is somewhat more variation in the expected change in
performance across sectors. Virtually all sectors were more
likely than Agriculture to have improving performance though this
difference was significant at the 90% level only in Education,
Health, and Structural Adjustment operations. Several sectors
had more unexplained variance than Agriculture: Development
Finance Corporations, Education, and Transportation and Tourism.
As noted above, the influence of supervision was uniform across
sectors.39
Once the interaction of loan amount and supervision is
considered, loan amount has a direct positive link to
performance. One interpretation of this is that large projects
show improving performance. However, loan amount tends to be
inversely related to the percentage of the project’s total cost
financed by the World Bank. Therefore, an alternative
explanation is that the positive coefficient reflects better
performance in projects with a greater percentage of domestic
funding.
The number of staff weeks of World Bank time contributed to
project preparation has a negative association with change in
performance. As with supervision in the probit estimation, the
negative coefficient does not indicate that World Bank inputs are
detrimental to performance. Rather, preparation inputs are high
when the project is complex or when the borrower’s planning
capabilities are limited. These same factors also contribute to
lower project performance.
Of the macroeconomic factors, only the annual growth rate of
GDP per capita has a significant impact on performance. The
relevance of macroeconomic conditions to project performance has
been noted by previous researchers and in World Bank annual
reviews. The insignificance of both the level of GDP per capita
and the degree of openness in the change in performance equation
implies that the impact of these variables is either on initial
performance (i.e., they classify the country as a high or low
project performance country) or very gradual and not well
captured by annual changes. Common wisdom at the World Bank is
that macroeconomic fluctuations have immediate consequences for
project performance. If so, these rapid changes are captured by
the growth rate.
47
Finally, the equation estimated does have time dependence as
measured by the fraction of the planned implementation period
47 The World Bank’s focus on the consequences of macroeconomic conditions is
reflected in the supervision allocation equation estimated in Section II in
which all three variables are significant.40
completed (t/T0i). Upward changes in performance are more likely
as the project nears completion. Various other dummy variables
(LAST = 1 if last year of project, LATE = 1 if project past its
planned closing date) were investigated but are dominated by
relative time.
48 However, the relevance of time cannot be
determined from the data. Performance may improve as old
problems are solved and, as implementation winds-up, few new
problems arise. Borrower and World Bank objectives may converge
as project resources become less fungible and public consensus
for the emerging project grows. However, there may be spurious
reasons for this time dependence such as cohort effects.
Table 9 presents simulation results which illustrate the
magnitude of the influence of the various factors on project
performance. Table 9 includes all variables which were
significant in Table 8 plus the Latin America and Caribbean
regional dummy variable. The table presents expectation
derivatives and expectation differences which are analogous to
probability derivatives and differences in an ordinary probit
estimation (see Appendix 1 for formulae). Expectation
derivatives are calculated for continuous variables and reflect
the impact of a marginal change in the variable on the expected
performance of an average project. Expectation differences are
calculated for discrete variables or for ranges of continuous
variables (e.g., plus and minus one standard deviation from the
mean) and reflect the impact of the discrete change in the
variable on the expected performance of the project. Since the
ordered probit is a nonlinear function, the values of the
expectation derivatives and expectation differences depend on the
point at which they are evaluated. To be representative of a
typical project, time varying variables are set to the sample
mean for the early implementation period and time invariant
48 Four time measures were investigated; only the fraction of project
implementation period completed ("relative time") is significant. The four
measures are: year of the project (t = 1,2,...,Ti), planned length of the
project (T0i), fraction of planned implementation period complete (Relative
time = t/T0i) and fiscal year (YEAR = 80,81,...).41
variables are set to the project-level means.
49 Examination of
all the variables reported in Table 9 is left to the reader;
below I discuss only supervision.
IV.2 The Impact of Supervision
The above direct examination of the coefficient estimates
provides a lot of information about the impact of supervision on
performance. We learn that: 1) World Bank supervision has a
measurable, positive impact on subsequent changes in performance;
2) early supervision is much more effective than later
supervision; 3) there appear to be diminishing returns to
supervision; 4) one staff week of supervision has more impact on
the performance rating of a project with a small loan than on the
performance rating of a project with a large loan; and 5) the
impact of supervision is relatively homogeneous across regions,
sectors and macroeconomic conditions. What is not immediately
apparent is the magnitude of the impact of supervision on
performance. Is it large enough in absolute terms to be of
interest? At current levels of supervision, is the marginal
benefit of supervision above or below the marginal cost?
The answer to the first question is found in Table 9 and
Figures 9 and 10. The first five rows of Table 9 report the
absolute and marginal impact of supervision on expected
performance for different levels of supervision. Evaluated at
49 Setting time invariant variables to project-level means rather than the
early implementation sample means is of relatively little consequence as
the means are not very different. However, time varying variables
(especially those representing the percent of the planned implementation
period completed -- t/T0 and (t/T0)2) should be evaluated at their early
period means, both for logical consistency and because the means in the
later period are significantly and systematically different.
This rule is used for Early Supervision, Region, Sector, Loan Amount, and
Preparation. However Late Supervision and (t/T0) are evaluated at
different means. Late Supervision is evaluated with time invariant
variables at project-level means but time varying variables at the late
implementation sample means. This give the appropriate expectation
derivative though makes comparison of expected changes in performance
difficult. The time measures (t/T0) are evaluated at the means for the
entire sample so that differences reflect only changes in (t/T0) rather
than changes in the means.42
the sample average (twelve staff weeks of supervision), the
marginal impact of early supervision on expected performance is
0.01 on a scale of 2 to 2. Figure 9 presents these simulation
results graphically (see discussion above).
The magnitude and meaning of a 0.01 point change in the
performance rating is more apparent when it is translated into
familiar terms, such as change in the economic rate of return or
the net present value of the project. Translating from the
change in performance to the change in the economic rate of
return is straightforward -- all that is required is
multiplication by a conversion factor. I use a conversion factor
of 0.05 which is consistent with data for projects where both the
final interim performance rating and the re-estimated economic
rate of return are reported.
50 The resulting marginal impact of
one staff week of supervision on the economic rate of return is
0.05 percentage points (evaluated at the sample mean).
Figure 10 presents the expected economic rate of return as a
function of the level of early supervision (analogous to Figure
9). The level of supervision indicated on the X-axis is
maintained for the first three years of this typical project.
51
The expected economic rate of return is fixed at the sample mean
(15.7 percent) for the average project (12 staff weeks of early
50 For projects in the sample with an expected economic rate of return at
completion:





For all projects with expected economic rates of return at completion in
the Operations Evaluation Department’s Annual Review Database through 1991:
Final Rating Average ERR Number of Projects
1 19.8 1243
0 3.4 370
The averages for unsatisfactory projects (3/4 for ARPP; 0 for OED) are
biased upward since reported rates of return are truncated at -5 percent.
51 This calculation uses the same means as in Table 9.43
supervision for 3 years); changes are relative to this point.
The graph indicates that an average economic rate of return of
18% may be achieved if an average annual level of supervision of
35 staff weeks is maintained for the first three years project
implementation. As before, an increase of one or two staff weeks
has a small impact but a substantial and sustained increase in
the average level of supervision may generate a noticeable
improvement in the average economic rate of return. Is the extra
supervision worthwhile?
If we translate the marginal benefit of supervision into
dollars, we can compare it with the marginal cost. I first work
through a simple example to illustrate how to convert from the
economic rate of return to dollars via the net present value and
what the type of results to expect. I then present results for a
more realistic case.
Consider an average project in the sample but imagine that
all the costs occur in the first year and that all benefits
accrue in the second year. The total project cost (C) is 180
million 1990 US dollars, the economic rate of return (d)i s0.157
and the marginal benefit of supervision in terms of the economic
rate of return (d’) is 0.0005.
The level of benefits is implicit in the economic rate of
return since we know the cost and the structure of the project.
By the definition of the economic rate of return, C = B or B = 1
1 d
(1+d)C = 1.157*$180,000,000 = $208,260,000. This must be
discounted to a present value: if the discount rate is 10
percent, the present value of benefits is $189,327,273. One
additional staff week of supervision increases the economic rate
of return to .1575 and the net present value of benefits to
1.1575*$180,000,000/(1.1) = $189,409,091. The extra staff week
of supervision increases the net present value of the project by
$81,818, many times the cost of an additional week of
supervision.44
This dramatic difference is driven by the size of World Bank
projects. Although the impact of a week of supervision on
overall performance is small, the cost of supervision is much
smaller relative to the total cost of the project. In the
calculation above -- if everything else remained constant -- the
marginal benefit of supervision exceeds the marginal cost as long
as the project total cost is above $12 million, a condition met
by most World Bank-funded projects.
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This example demonstrates the procedure for converting the
marginal benefit of supervision from economic rate of return
terms to dollar terms. The example also points out that the
marginal benefit of supervision in dollar terms is likely to be
large relative to the marginal cost simply because of leverage
due to the size of projects. The actual marginal benefit
calculated is not correct, however, because the cost and benefit
structures are over-simplified and do not represent the "typical"
project.
The marginal benefit calculated with the cost and benefit
structure of a typical project is illustrated in Figure 11. For
this calculation, I assume that the typical project has a seven
year implementation period followed by a ten year benefit period.
The cost stream is front loaded as in real projects; I assume
that the percentage of the total cost spent in each year is {.1,
.25, .4, .1, .05, .05, .05}. The benefit stream is constant over
the ten years. Furthermore, I assume that supervision increases
benefits uniformly while having no impact on costs. See Appendix
2 for the exact formula for the marginal benefit and for a
sensitivity analysis of the assumptions.
The marginal benefit curve in Figure 11 is even higher than
that implied by the simple example and much larger than the
marginal cost of supervision -- more than a hundred times larger
at twelve staff weeks of supervision. The main point to take
52 Of course, the estimated equation shows that the impact of supervision (d’)
increases as the project size (loan amount) falls so that even a project
below $12 million would have MBS>MCS.45
away from these calculations is that, in both specifications, the
marginal benefit of early supervision greatly exceeds the
marginal cost at current levels of supervision. This result is
quite robust to the assumptions made (though the exact magnitude
of the marginal benefit does vary). For a broad range of
specifications for cost and benefit streams, the marginal benefit
of supervision at current levels exceeds the marginal cost. In
fact, the first example provides an effective lower limit on the
marginal benefit of supervision.
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For a number of reasons, the exact level of the marginal
benefit curve and where it crosses the marginal cost curve in the
diagram may be somewhat inaccurate and should be interpreted with
caution. The nature of the estimation makes it more reliable
near the sample average (twelve staff weeks of supervision);
conclusions based on behavior at the extremes (near 0 and 80
staff weeks, for example) are less robust. In addition, the
graph reflects the assumptions on the structure of costs and
benefits discussed above. As the first example demonstrates, the
particular structure of costs and benefits has a strong influence
on the imputed dollar value of supervision. Finally, if reported
economic rates of return are inaccurate (e.g., inflated), then
the implied marginal benefit of supervision in terms of dollars
will be somewhat lower. Rather than focusing on the exact level
of supervision which equates the marginal benefit and marginal
cost, it is more appropriate to underline that the benefits of
supervision are substantial and that the marginal benefit of
supervision greatly exceeds the marginal cost at current
supervision levels.
Once again, it is the size of the project which magnifies
the impact of supervision and translates a small change in
project performance into a large change in dollar terms. For
example in the project described in Figure 11, the present value
53 This result is "experimental" rather than analytical. The one period cost,
one period benefit structure had the lowest MBS among all the
specifications tried.46
of the benefits is $230 million at the average economic rate of
return of 15.7 percent. If the economic rate of return increases
by one percentage point to 16.7 percent, the present value of
benefits increases to $248 million -- a gain of $18 million.
Thus, the small influence of supervision on performance ratings
translates into a large change in the dollar value of the project
relative to the cost of supervision. This leverage due to size
is similar to that in Margiotta and Miller (1993) where
expenditures to mitigate incentive problems of top executives
have over a hundred fold return in terms of the expected profits
of the firm.
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IV.3 Final Performance Simulation
The relation between the estimates of the interim
performance ordered probit reported in Table 8 and the final
performance probit reported in Section II and Table 6 is not
immediately clear. The general argument -- that the differential
allocation of supervision to projects with poor interim
performance might overwhelm the positive impact of supervision on
performance and result in a negative correlation -- is clear; but
do the equations estimated for annual performance and annual
supervision have this implication? Furthermore, given the
different performance measures used and the assumptions required
to estimate the interim performance equation, how closely do the
final and interim estimations agree? Exploring this issue may
better explain the negative aggregate relation between
supervision and performance and provide a rough consistency check
for the interim performance estimation.
To address this question, I simulate aggregate data with the
annual model and compare the results of a probit estimation using
these simulated data to those using the actual data (Table 6).
The procedure uses the estimated change in performance and
54 Margiotta and Miller measure total benefits rather than marginal benefits
since their model is discrete.47
supervision allocation equations and the estimated annual update
rule to simulate a series of annual ratings and supervision
allocations based on initial conditions and exogenous factors.
The last interim performance rating, together with project
characteristics, is used to simulate final performance data.
Summing annual supervision over the life of the project yields
cumulative supervision.
The simulation proceeds by year, starting with the second
year for which data are available (the first year provides
starting values). There are three steps for each year. The
first step simulates the change in performance by plugging the
exogenous variables and the simulated supervision level for the
previous year (or the starting value in the first round) into the
estimated change in performance equation and adding a
heteroskedastic random error term. The second step uses the
annual update rule and the estimated threshold values to convert
the change in performance to a change in the rating; the rating
change is then added to the previous year’s simulated rating (or
the starting value in the first round). The third step simulates
supervision allocation by plugging exogenous variables and
simulated ratings into the estimated supervision equation and
adding a (different) random error term. The process repeats
until the last year of the project.
The last step is to convert the last interim performance
rating into a final performance rating according to conditional
transition probabilities. These conditional probabilities were
estimated from the actual data with three separate probit
equations (which included project characteristics as conditioning
variables): one for projects with the last interim rating of 1,
another for those with 2 and a third for those with 3 or 4. The
estimated equations were used to generate predicted final
performance P ^*
i from the last simulated interim performance rating
and project characteristics. The final rating is generated
according to the rule: P ^
i=1 if P ^*
i³0, 0 otherwise.
Table 10 repeats the probit estimation of Table 6 using the48
simulated data P ^
i and S ^
i. Since the data are simulated,
different draws yield different data. To provide a table
comparable to Table 6 but representative of simulation results, I
repeated the simulation / re-estimation process forty times,
ordered the results according to the magnitude of the first
supervision coefficient and selected the twentieth one.
As with the true data, there is a negative relation between
cumulative supervision and final ratings; supervision
coefficients are also the same order of magnitude ( 0.015
compared with 0.033 and 0.000014 compared with 0.000061).
Agreement among other coefficients is not quite as good: three
of seventeen coefficients differ in sign and magnitudes also
vary.
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The simulation demonstrates consistency between the interim
performance estimation and the final ratings. Together the
estimated interim performance and supervision allocation
equations (and the feedback relation embodied in them) do imply
the negative aggregate relationship between final performance and
cumulative supervision. In addition, the similarity of the
coefficients suggests that the annual model describes the
relation between supervision and performance fairly well. More
specifically, the concern that interim ratings reflect an "ex
post justification bias" which artificially inflates the impact
of supervision is not supported by the comparison between final
ratings. Rather, the difference between the supervision
coefficients for actual and simulated data suggests either an
55 The signs of the first supervision coefficient is stable across all draws
though there is variance in magnitude. In the forty repetitions, this
coefficient ranged from -0.045 and to -.019 with the middle twenty values
falling between -0.038 and -0.028. Other coefficients were more variable.
Overall variability is demonstrated by the correlation between simulated
and actual final ratings. In the example presented the correlation is
0.15; the range in the sample of forty draws is from 0.11 to 0.19.
Estimation based on a larger sample would stabilize the results but
comparison with the actual data set would be more difficult. Note that
these simulations condition on the starting values of the actual data
rather than generating new starting values according to an estimated
distribution. This approach is taken because the goal is to see if the
interim model explains the final performance results.49
underestimate of the impact of supervision in the interim
performance equation or an overestimate of the responsiveness of
supervision to performance in the supervision allocation
equation.50
V. Conclusion
This paper attempts to measure the impact of World Bank
supervision on the performance of World Bank-funded projects and
finds that supervision does improve performance. The model
estimated indicates that the benefits from supervision far
outweigh the costs simply because of the size of projects.
Supervision is most effective early in the implementation period
and in projects with smaller loans. While there is little
evidence that a single additional week of World Bank supervision
will dramatically change project performance, larger and more
persistent differences in the level of World Bank supervision can
have a significant impact. The average expected economic rate of
return appears to be a few percentages points higher with the
current level of supervision than if the World Bank did not
supervise; substantial increases above the current level of
supervision are predicted to have a similar effect. When
translated into dollar figures, these small changes in the
economic rate of return indicate large gains in dollar terms,
gains that appear to justify increased supervision.
If more supervision is justified, what form should it take?
Part of the answer to this question is clear: additional
supervision would be more productive during the initial stages of
implementation. But what type of supervision should be
increased? World Bank supervision includes two functionally
separate activities: monitoring and assistance. However, these
activities are not recorded separately in World Bank data making
it difficult to determine how much each activity contributes to
the overall impact of supervision.
The difference between supervision as monitoring and
supervision as assistance is explored in Kilby (1994). Several
observations from that paper are relevant here. According to the
argument presented, if monitoring is the more important element
of supervision, then the impact of supervision on performance
will be homogeneous across regions and sectors and will depend on51
the source of funds. The observed link between supervision and
performance has both of these characteristics. Finally, because
no substitute for World Bank monitoring exists, the impact of
World Bank supervision as monitoring should be observable. In
contrast, substitutes for World Bank assistance are available
(e.g., international consultants) and may be purchased by the
borrowing government when World Bank supervision is low. If
this is the case, World Bank supervision is simply a residual
which may be unrelated to the overall level of assistance and, as
a result, the impact of World Bank supervision as assistance may
not be observable.
Thus, the influence of supervision measured in this paper
may be largely attributable to monitoring rather than assistance.
While no conclusive evidence is currently available, this does
provide a direction for future research -- to distinguish
empirically between supervision as monitoring and supervision as
assistance.52
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Appendix 1: Likelihood Function
This appendix derives the likelihood function discussed in
Section III and used in the change in performance estimation
(Table 8). I also derive formulae for calculating expected
values and expectation derivatives. These formulae are used to
generate Table 9 and simulated values presented in the text.
The latent variable model for the change in performance is:
DP
*
i,t = X¢ i,tb + ui,t ui,t~N(0,s
2
u(Xi)) t>1 (A1.1)
E(ui,tuj,s) = 0 for i¹j and for t¹s
where X includes supervision and b includes the coefficient for
supervision. The relation between the latent variable DP
* and
the observed index DP is that of an ordered probit though the
threshold rules are complicated by a change in the rating system
in fiscal year 1986 and by the limits of the rating scale:
If Pi,t-1=1
DPi,t =- 2i f D P
*
i,t < DP-2
=- 1i fD P -2 £D P
*
i,t < DP-1
=0 i f D P -1 £D P
*
i,t
If Pi,t-1=2 and pre-FY86 If Pi,t-1=2 and FY86 or later
DPi,t =- 2i f D P
*
i,t < DP-2
DPi,t =- 1i f D P
*
i,t < DP-1 =- 1i fD P -2 £D P
*
i,t < DP-1
=0 i f D P -1 £D P
*
i,t < DP1 =0 i f D P -1 £D P
*
i,t < DP1
=1 i f D P 1 £D P
*
i,t =1 i f D P 1 £D P
*
i,t
If Pi,t-1=3 and pre-FY87 If Pi,t-1=3 and FY87 or later
DPi,t =- 1i f D P
*
i,t < DP-1
DPi,t =0 i f D P
*
i,t < DP1 =0 i f D P -1 £D P
*
i,t < DP1
=1 i f D P 1 £D P
*
i,t < DP2 =1 i f D P 1 £D P
*
i,t < DP2
=2 i f D P 1 £D P
*




=0 i f D P
*
i,t < DP1
=1 i f D P 1 £D P
*
i,t < DP2
=2 i f D P 2 £D P
*
i,t
These rules are derived by starting with an standard ordered
probit relationship and then considering where the rating scale
limits what is observed. One way of viewing this is to imagine
an intermediate variable DP
**, the "desired" change in rating.
The desired change is only observed when it can be accommodated
by the rating scale, i.e., when boundary constraints do not bind.
An ordered probit likelihood function which follows directly
from equation (A1.1) and the threshold rules outlined above:
















D86i,tYi,t,2,-2F-2 Yi,t,2,-1(F-1 D86i,tF-2)Y i,t,2,0(F1 F-1)Y i,t,2,1(1 F1)
D87i,tYi,t,3,-1F-1 Yi,t,3,0(F1 D87i,tF-1)Y i,t,3,1(F2 F1)Y i,t,3,2(1 F2)
D87i,tYi,t,4,0F1 D87i,tYi,t,4,1(F2 F1) D87i,tYi,t,4,2(1 F2))
where :
Yi,t,j,k 1i fP i,t-1 j and DPi,t k, 0 otherwise
Fk F((DPk X¢ i,tg)/s(Xi)) (k -2,-1,1,2)
s(Xi) sqrt(1 X¢ i q) scale factor (standard deviation)
D86i,t 1 if Fiscal Year ³ FY86, 0 otherwise
D87i,t 1 if Fiscal Year ³ FY87, 0 otherwise
The F terms can be collected to simplify evaluation of the
function:






C1 Yi,t,1,0 Yi,t,2,1 Yi,t,3,2 D86i,tYi,t,4,2
C2 Yi,t,1,-2 Yi,t,1,-1 D86i,tYi,t,2,-2 D86i,tYi,t,2,-1
C3 Yi,t,1,-1 Yi,t,1,0 Yi,t,2,-1 Yi,t,2,0 D87i,tYi,t,3,-1 D87i,tYi,t,3,0
C4 Yi,t,2,0 Yi,t,2,1 Yi,t,3,0 Yi,t,3,1 D87i,tYi,t,4,0 D87i,tYi,t,4,1
C5 Yi,t,3,1 Yi,t,3,2 D87i,tYi,t,4,1 D87i,tYi,t,4,2
The expected rating conditional on Pi,t-1 and Xi,t is given by the
formula:





Yi,t,1(2F -2 1( F -1 F-2)0( 1F -1))
Yi,t,2( 2 D86i,tF-2 1( F -1 D86i,tF-2)0( F 1F -1)1( 1F 1 ))
Yi,t,3( 1 D87i,tF-1 0( F 1 D87i,tF-1)1( F 2F 1 )2( 1F 2 ))
Yi,t,4(0 D87i,tF1 1 D87i,t(F2 F1) 2 D87i,t(1 F2))
Yi,t,1( F-2 F-1)Y i,t,2( D86i,tF-2 F-1 F1 1)
Yi,t,3( D87i,tF-1 F1 F2 2) Yi,t,4D87i,t( F1 F2 2)





(Yi,t,1(f-2 f-1)Y i,t,2(D86i,tf-2 f-1 f1)
¶Xi,t ¢g / s ( X i )
¶ X i , t , k
Y i,t,3(D87i,tf-1 f1 f2)Y i,t,4D87i,t(f1 f2))
where:
Yi,t,j 1i fP i,t-1 j, 0 otherwise
fk f((DPk X¢ i,tg)/s(Xi))
To get the expected value of DP and the expectation derivative
conditional only on X, we multiply through by the unconditional
probability of the initial state, qj Pr(P j). Dropping
unnecessary subscripts, equations (A1.4) and (A1.5) become:
E(DP X)k q j Pr(DPkP -1 j,X) (A1.6)
2
k 2
q1( F-2 F-1)q 2 ( D86 F-2 F-1 F1 1)
q3( D87 F-1 F1 F2 2) q4D86( F1 F2 2)





q 3(D87 f-1 f1 f2)q 4 D86(f1 f2))
These formulae are used to calculate Table 9 and Figures 9 to
11. The parameters g, q, and DPk and the probabilities qj are
replaced by their maximum likelihood estimates and, except where
otherwise indicated, X is set equal to the sample mean. g ^, q ^,
and Dp ^k are maximum likelihood estimates from equation (A1.3) and














The sample mean of X is used for expedience; reporting results
for the different categorical variables separately would be
unwieldy and un-enlightening. Similarly, use of q ^j is acceptable
when dealing with mean values.59
For simulations, one may want to compute the expected value
based on a sequence of independent variables {Xi,t}:
q ~
j(Pi,1,Xi,2,Xi,3,...,Xi,t) = f(j,t)
where f is defined recursively as
f(j,t) = g(j-i,i) f(i,t-1) fort>1
4
i1
= Pr(P1= j ) f o rt=1
g(k,i) = Pr(DP=k P-1=i)
If we condition on a known initial rating Pi,1, then
Pr(Pi,1=j) = 1 for one j and 0 for the other values of j. If we
do not condition on an initial rating, then Pr(Pi,1 Xi,1) must be
estimated. To do this, we first estimate an ordered probit using
only the initial period data (the first ratings and the time-
invariant variables) and then predict the probabilities
Pr(Pi,1=j Xi,1) for j=1,2,3,4. This method assumes that the
processes generating the first rating and subsequent changes in
performance are unrelated.60
Appendix 2
Part I: Covariance Derivation
Equation (2.4) of Section II can be rewritten as:








Summing overt=1t oT - 1f o ragiven r yields
1












In the notation used in Section II, r=ga,m=gs
2
u, and
E(Siui)= - ( s
2
u / a )*(T-1+[1-(1+ga)
T-1]/ga) ga¹0
If r and s
2
u are non-zero, then E(Siui)¹0 except possibly at a
single value of r. I assume that supervision improves
performance and more supervision is allocated to bad projects,
i.e., a>0, g<0, => r<0. For all T, E(Siui) is negative for rÎ(-
2,0) with limg­0E(Siui)=0 and lima¯0E(Siui)=gs
2
u (T-1)(T-2)/2<0, T>2.
For T odd, E(Siui) is strictly negative for all values of r; for
1 r=0 if a=0 or g=0. If a=0, the correlation between Si and ui is irrelevant.
If g=0, m=0 and f(t,r)=0 " t,r so that Si and ui are uncorrelated.61
T even, E(Siui) crosses the 0-axis once in the range [-3,-2) --
at r=-3 for T=4 and approaching r=-2 for T approaching infinity.
Part II: Converting to the Marginal Benefit of Supervision in
Dollars
The following is the framework for converting the marginal
benefit of supervision from economic rate of return terms to
dollars terms. It is used to generate Figure 11. I also present
a sensitivity analysis which demonstrates that the condition MBS
>M C S holds over most of the range of supervision values
considered even if we relax the assumptions used to calculate
Figure 11.














where Ct and Bt are the cost and benefit in period t. Define Ct =


















C, the nominal total project cost, is known; and reasonable
weights {ft}, {gt} can be constructed.
2 Therefore, (A2.2) can be
solved for B as a function of d:
2 An economic rate of return is unique if sign(Bt -C t ) switches no more than
once (a "single crossing" property) and $ t s.t. Bt ¹ Ct. These conditions
are satisfied by imposing them directly on {ft} and {gt} (though, in
general, there may be weaker conditions which also work). The examples I














With an expression for B, we can calculate the net present value
of the project evaluated in period i:













where R is the World Bank’s discount rate. The marginal benefit
of supervision evaluated in period i is . Assume that ¶NPVi
¶S






is affected by supervision. Some structure must be placed on
these derivatives; setting them to 0 is the simplest solution.
3
With these assumptions, the marginal benefit of supervision
evaluated in period i is:







The first term simply discounts the change in benefits back to
period i:
3 Fixing B and allowing C to vary results in a larger marginal benefit of
supervision when R<d. Hence, the method chosen gives a conservative
estimate. Requiring ft and gt to be fixed means that any change is costs
or benefits is proportional across years. If either ft or gt is allowed to
vary, the pattern of variation must be specified since several different
changes can cause the same change in economic rate of return but result in
different changes in the NPV (and vice versa). In any case, it seems
likely that supervision has some impact on the actual level of benefits (or
costs) rather than just advancing or postponing them.63









The second term in (A2.5) can be derived by differentiating





























































H1( ft ,d)H2( gt ,d) H3( gt ,d)H4( ft ,d)
H2( gt ,d)2
= d¢ C H({ft,gt},d) (A2.7)
where d¢ is ¶d/¶S. Making the dependence on supervision explicit
and combining (A2.6) and (A2.7), the expected marginal benefit of
supervision measured in dollars evaluated at year i is given by:
MBS,i(S) = d¢(S) C H({ft,gt},d(S)) H0(i,{gt},R) (A2.8)
Figure 11 uses equation (A2.8) with R=.1, {ft} = {.1, .25, .4,
.1, .05, .05., .05}, {gt} = {.1}
16
t=7 and S ranging from 0 to 80
staff weeks. d¢(S) is given by (A1.7) and (A1.8) using estimates
in Table 8 and the conversion factor of 0.05 discussed in the
text. d(S) is given by (A1.6) and (A1.8) using estimates in
Table 8 and the conversion factor but is converted from the
expected change in the economic rate of return to the expected64
level of the economic rate of return. This "normalization" is
achieved by adding the sample average economic rate of return and
subtracting the expected change in the economic rate of return at
the average level of supervision: d(S) = d +( Dd(S) - Dd(S)) =
0.157 + (Dd(S) - (-0.014)). This has the desired property that
the average project at the average level of supervision is
expected to have the average economic rate of return. This is
the same normalization used in Figure 10 to "locate" the expected
economic rate of return curve.
Sensitivity Analysis:
We may be able to characterize how the simulated MBS varies
with d¢,C ,R ,{ f t }, {gt}, and d and thus identify the direction
and magnitude of bias if these variables specified inaccurately.
The first two variables enter (A2.8) linearly so that MBS is
proportional to them: an overestimate of d¢ or C results in an
overestimate of MBS. An over-estimate of d¢ may be the result of
an incorrect conversion from the change in performance rating to
the change in economic rate of return. The conversion factor may
be incorrect simply because of the method used or because of a
conditional or proportional bias in reported economic rates of
return. In any case, it is hard to imagine this factor being
outside the interval [.02, .10]. Errors in total project cost
data may introduce errors of a lessor magnitude. Neither of
these would reverse the inequality MBS >M C S near the current
level of supervision.
The impact of R is also straightforward:





















if the marginal benefit of supervision is positive. Thus,
picking a discount rate higher than the World Bank’s actual
discount rate introduces a downward bias in the simulated MBS.65
The magnitude of such a mistake is again relatively small. For
example, H0(0,{gt},R=0.05) = 0.58, H0(0,{gt},R=0.10) = 0.35,
H0(0,{gt},R=0.15) = 0.22 for {gt} described above.
The impact of an incorrect distribution of costs can also be
characterized for some types of distributions. Any sequence {ft ¢}
can be constructed from the sequence used {ft} and transfers of
weight from fs to fr. For any transfer from fs to fr, fs 1
t¹s
ft





















(t r)a r (t s)a s a tgt
where a = 1/(1+d) is between 0 and 1 and K,K’ are positive
constants. Assume thatr>sa n dg t = 0 for t £ r (e.g.,
benefits begin after implementation). When gt is non-zero, (t-
s)>0, (t-r)>0, and (t-s)>(t-r). Since a is between 0 and 1, a
s ³
a
r and, finally, (t-s)a
s > (t-r)a
r. Each term in sum (3) is
negative -- the simulated MBS decreases as costs are shifted to a
later period. Conversely, excessive front-loading of the cost
structure introduces an upward bias in the simulated MBS.
Once again, within the reasonable choices for {ft}, the
possible bias would not reverse the ordering of MBS and MCS in
the relevant range. For example, if the current front-loaded
distribution {.1, .25, .4, .1, .05, .05, .05} were replaced with
the smoother distribution {.1, .15, .15, .15, .15, .15, .15}, the
marginal benefit of supervision at twelve staff weeks is $622,850
instead of $786,663. The new MBS curve crosses the MCS curve at
78 staff weeks whereas the old curve crossed at 79 staff weeks.66
For {gt}, there is no general result for the sign of the
bias:
MBS =K ² (b
r-b
















The first term in (4) is negative ifr>ssince0<b<1b u t
the second term may be positive or negative. Hence, the sign of
(4) depends on R, d,{ f t }, {gt}, r, and s. Here as well, the
bias is typically too small to dramatically change the point at
which the marginal benefit curve crosses the marginal cost curve.
If the assumed length of the cost and benefit streams is
incorrect, a slightly larger bias is introduced. In general, the
longer the actual stream of costs and benefits, the greater is
the implied nominal benefit (B) and the greater will be the
imputed MBS. The increase in the imputed MBS is roughly
proportional to the length of the cost and benefit streams at the
average level of supervision (as can be seen from the examples in
Section IV) but the point at which MBS =M C S is less variable.
In the simple example in the text where all costs are in the
first year and all benefits are in the second year, the marginal
benefit curve crosses the marginal cost curve at 72 staff weeks
of supervision.
An change in d has an ambiguous but relatively small effect
on the calculated value for MBS. The sign depends on {ft}, {gt},
and the initial level of d. For the values used in Figure 11,
using d = 0.10 instead of 0.157 gives a MBS = $552,500 at 1267
staff weeks of supervision; MBS crosses MCS at 78 staff weeks.
The conclusion of this sensitivity analysis is that the
computed value of MBS is somewhat sensitive to the assumptions
made but the condition that MBS >M C S over the relevant range of
S is robust.68
Appendix 3: Data Sources
This appendix lists data sources and variable definitions.
Sufficient detail is provided for reconstructing the data set.
1
All data are from the World Bank. No disaggregate data can be
released by the author without the express written permission of
the World Bank.
Several databases were used to compile this data set. The
Operation Evaluation Department’s Annual Review Database (as of
the end of 1991) is the source for final performance and some
other time invariant project-specific data. This is referred to
as OED. Some of the variables in the OED database (loan amount,
total project cost, various dates) are originally from either the
Financial Database (FDB) or the World Bank’s Management
Information System (OPMIS). Data for annual interim ratings,
annual supervision, and preparation were taken directly from
various parts of OPMIS. These parts include the Time Recording
System (TRS) and the Annual Review of Portfolio Performance
(ARPP). Macroeconomic indicators were constructed from data in
the World Bank’s Basic Economic and Social Indicators Database
(BESD) according to standard definitions. Institutional
variables in the supervision equation were constructed with TRS
data and OED dates, using the organizational structure implied by
Master Organization Codes (MOC) from the Personnel Database.
1 With some exceptions. Some projects were reclassified into the TA and
SECAL sectors because their project names conflicted with their original
classification. Though relatively few projects were reclassified, they are
too numerous to list here. In addition, the last five "institutional"
variables are based on departmental divisions which changed over time;
these divisions were reconstructed from the Personnel database but it is

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1: Final Performance Rating
# Observations = 1426
Percent
Variable Count Satisfactory
Final Performance Rating 71.2
Pi = 1 (Satisfactory Rating) 1015




Europe, Middle East & North Africa 238 81.1
Latin American & Caribbean 309 67.6
Sectors
Agriculture 467 61.5





Structural Adjustment Loan 33 60.6
Technical Assistance 45 57.8




Small Loans 974 69.5
Large Loans 452 74.8
Supervision Level
Low Supervision 860 75.8
High Supervision 566 64.1
Loan Amount in 1990 US$. Division between Large and Small Loans
is sample project mean (US$ 58.2 million). Division between High
and Low Supervision is sample project mean (81.7 staff weeks).
Structural Adjustment includes Sectoral Adjustment. Other
includes Disaster Relief and Multisector projects.75
Table 2: Annual Interim Performance Rating
# Observations = 7461
Mean
Variable Count Rating
Interim Performance Rating 1.83
Pi,t = 1 (Good) 2251
Pi,t = 2 4303
Pi,t = 3 852




Europe, Middle East & North Africa 1175 1.82
Latin American & Caribbean 1587 1.88
Sectors
Agriculture 2611 1.97





Structural Adjustment Loan 77 1.64
Technical Assistance 210 1.60




Small Loan 5149 1.86
Large Loan 2312 1.75
Supervision Level
A
Low Supervision in year t-1 3649 1.79
High Supervision in year t-1 2378 1.99
Loan Amount in 1990 US$. Division between Large and Small Loans
is sample project mean (US$ 58.2 million). Division between High
and Low Supervision is sample mean (11.8 staff weeks).
Structural Adjustment includes Sectoral Adjustment. Other
includes Disaster Relief and Multisector projects.
A Based on 6027 observations to allow for lag.76
Table 3: Annual Change in Interim Performance Rating
# Observations = 6027 DPi,t º Pi,t-1 -P i,t
Mean Change
Variable Count in Rating
Change in Interim Performance Rating -0.036
DPi,t = -2 (Worse) 53
DPi,t = -1 786
DPi,t = 0 4538
DPi,t = 1 627




Europe, Middle East & North Africa 931 -0.054
Latin American & Caribbean 1277 -0.022
Sectors
Agriculture 2144 -0.051





Structural Adjustment Loan 45 0.067
Technical Assistance 165 -0.067




Small Loan 4171 -0.037
Large Loan 1856 -0.034
Supervision Level
Low Supervision in year t-1 3649 -0.049
High Supervision in year t-1 2378 -0.017













Loan Amount in 1990 US$. Division between Large and Small Loans
is sample project mean (US$ 58.2 million). Division between High
and Low Supervision is sample mean (11.8 staff weeks).
Structural Adjustment includes Sectoral Adjustment. Other
includes Disaster Relief and Multisector projects. There are
1434 individual time series because 8 of the 1426 projects have
"broken" time series due to one missing rating observation each.77
Table 4: Transition Frequencies
1 2 3,4
1 70.5 27.3 2.2
2 10.7 80.7 8.6










4C: Last Interim to
Final Rating
Figures indicate percentage of row state which become column



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6: Final Performance Estimation
Method = Probit
# Observations = 1426
Dependent Variable = Pi Mean = 0.71
Log Likelihood = -760.31
Parameter Estimate t-stat
Cumulative Supervision
Si -0.015 -3.76 **
(Si)
2 0.000014 1.34
Regions (base = Africa)
Asia 0.70 2.35 **
Europe, Middle East & North Africa 0.50 1.42
Latin American & Caribbean -0.049 -0.18
Sectors (base = Agriculture)
Development Finance Corporations 0.59 1.55
Education 1.61 3.84 **




Structural Adjustment Loan 0.077 0.17
Technical Assistance -0.20 -0.37
Transportation and Tourism 1.29 3.96 **
Urban 2.23 4.20 **
Other Ex Ante Characteristics
Loan Amount -0.0017 -1.09
Preparation -0.00030 -0.17
Macroeconomic Variables
Growth of GDP per Capita 0.21 4.42 **
Change in Index of Openness 0.017 3.38 **
Constant 1.41 4.04 **
* significant at the 90% confidence level
** significant at the 95% confidence level
Includes correction for Heteroskedasticity: each observation was
divided by the square root of Ti, the length of the project (s
2
u is
assumed to be 1).81
Table 7: Supervision Estimation
Method = Ordinary Least Squares
# Observations = 6027 Mean = 10.4




P2i,t 1.84 6.13 **
P34i,t 3.28 6.78 **
P3i,t 2.31 2.98 **
P4i,t 4.39 3.33 **
P2i,t-1 1.40 4.68 **




(t/T0i) -11.97 -13.41 **
(t/T0i)
2 2.48 6.54 **
Regions (base = Africa)
Asia 0.91 1.88 *
Europe, Middle East & North Africa -0.67 -1.15
Latin American & Caribbean -0.68 -1.30
Sectors (base = Agriculture)
Development Finance Corporations -1.93 -4.64 **
Education -0.55 -1.41
Energy -0.86 -2.67 **
Health 7.26 8.56 **
Industry -1.29 -2.34 **
Multisector 2.41 1.55
Structural Adjustment Loan 8.62 7.14 **
Technical Assistance 4.39 6.53 **
Transportation and Tourism -0.15 -0.45
Urban 2.08 4.32 **
Other Ex Ante Characteristics
Loan Amount 0.021 4.99 **
(Loan Amount)
2 -0.000041 -3.30 **
Preparation 0.027 15.54 **
Macroeconomic Variables
Growth of GDP per Capita 4.28 1.84 *
GDP per Capita Level -0.00042 -3.10 **
Change in Index of Openness -1.64 -3.80 **
Institutional Variables (by Department)
# of Staff 0.0063 2.17 **
Staff Supervision Resources 0.0055 10.39 **
Consultant Supervision Resources 0.0044 4.10 **
# of Planned Projects -0.019 -6.28 **
# of Unplanned Projects -0.14 -5.25 **
(# of Unplanned Projects)
2 0.00050 3.73 **
Constant 13.11 11.78 **
* significant at the 90% confidence level
** significant at the 95% confidence level82
Table 8: Interim Performance Estimation
Method = Ordered Probit
# Observations = 6027 DPt = -2,-1,0,1,2
Dependent Variable = DPt Mean = -0.036
Log Likelihood = -4213.60
Parameter Estimate t-stat
Annual Supervision
Early Si,t-1 0.034 2.65 **





Time (base = Early)
Late 2.62 1.13
(Early t/T0i) 14.13 1.06




2 -0.31 -4.60 **
Regions (base = Africa)
Asia 0.048 0.99
Europe, Middle East & North Africa -0.065 -1.07
Latin American & Caribbean -0.018 -0.30
Sectors (base = Agriculture)
Development Finance Corporations 0.043 0.59
Education 0.18 2.62 **
Energy 0.064 1.25
Health 0.28 2.00 **
Industry -0.10 -1.06
Multisector 0.22 0.69
Structural Adjustment Loan 0.36 1.72 *
Technical Assistance 0.031 0.28
Transportation and Tourism 0.070 1.28
Urban 0.11 1.34
Other Ex Ante Characteristics
Loan Amount 0.0018 4.15 **
Early Si,t-1 Loan Amount -0.00014 -2.55 **
Late Si,t-1 Loan Amount -0.000062 -2.83 **
Preparation -0.00054 -1.90 *
Macroeconomic Variables
Growth of GDP per Capita 0.79 2.11 **
GDP per Capita Level 0.000022 0.98
Change in Index of Openness 0.093 1.35
* significant at the 90% confidence level
** significant at the 95% confidence level
**** Continued on next page ****83
Table 8: Interim Performance Estimation -- Continued
Parameter Estimate t-stat
Heteroskedasticity Coefficients
Asia -0.13 -2.18 **
Europe, Middle East & North Africa -0.13 -1.70 *
Latin American & Caribbean -0.031 -0.40
Development Finance Corporations 0.36 2.80 **





Structural Adjustment Loan -0.037 -0.12
Technical Assistance -0.071 -0.50





Dp1 4.71 2.03 **
Dp2 5.93 2.55 **
* significant at the 90% confidence level
** significant at the 95% confidence level84
Table 9: Expected Change in Performance
and Expectation Derivatives
Expected Change Expectation
Variable in Performance Derivative
Early Supervision = 0 -0.40 0.012
Early Supervision = 2
A -0.37 0.012
Early Supervision = 12
B -0.28 0.009
Early Supervision = 22
C -0.20 0.007
Early Supervision = 80 -0.0023 0








Europe, Middle East & North Africa -0.33
Latin American & Caribbean -0.32
Agriculture -0.32




Transportation and Tourism -0.30
Loan Amount = 1
F -0.31






All other time varying variables at mean for Early Period
(t/T0i<.5); all other time invariant variables at project-level
mean. The variables presented are those which are significant at
the 90% confidence level in Table 8 plus Latin American and
Caribbean. Calculations based on Equations (A1.6), (A1.7), and
(A1.8) from Appendix 1 and coefficient estimates from Table 8.
A Mean - 1 standard deviation
B Mean
C Mean + 1 standard deviation
D All other time varying variables at mean for Late Period
(t/T0i³.5).
E All other time varying variables at mean for entire data set.
F Lowest observation (used if (Mean-standard deviation)<0)85
Table 10: Simulated Final Performance Estimation
Method = Probit
# Observations = 1426
Dependent Variable = P ^
i Mean = 0.81




i -0.033 -4.56 **
(S ^
i)
2 0.000061 2.39 **
Regions (base = Africa)
Asia 1.79 5.26 **
Europe, Middle East & North Africa 1.62 3.77 **
Latin American & Caribbean 0.45 1.47
Sectors (base = Agriculture)
Development Finance Corporations 0.015 0.034
Education 1.76 3.68 **
Energy 1.81 4.42 **
Health 1.07 1.06
Industry -1.57 -3.13 **
Multisector -1.54 -1.52
Structural Adjustment Loan -1.25 -2.27 **
Technical Assistance -0.35 -0.64
Transportation and Tourism 1.70 4.31 **
Urban 0.35 0.69
Other Ex Ante Characteristics
Loan Amount 0.0033 1.62
Preparation 0.0000046 0.00023
Macroeconomic Variables
Growth of GDP per Capita 0.21 3.92 **
Change in Index of Openness 0.0073 1.33
Constant 3.00 5.85 **
* significant at the 90% confidence level
** significant at the 95% confidence level
Includes correction for Heteroskedasticity: each observation was
divided by the square root of Ti, the length of the project.86
















Cumulative Supervision in Staff Weeks
















Cumulative Supervision in Staff Weeks87
















Annual Supervision in Staff Weeks
















Annual Supervision in Staff Weeks88
Figure 5 -- Expected Final Performance
























Cumulative Supervision in Staff Weeks
* = Predicted probability of a satisfactory final rating as a
function of cumulative supervision with all explanatory
variables at actual values.
= Predicted probability of a satisfactory final rating as a
function of cumulative supervision for an average project
(all explanatory variables except supervision set to sample
mean values).89


































- = Predicted supervision allocation in staff weeks as a
function of the sum of the current and previous interim
performance ratings for an average project (all explanatory
variables except performance ratings set to sample mean
values). Where different rating combinations result in the
same sum, the supervision allocation reported is a weighted
average of the predicted supervision allocations for the
individual rating combinations. Weights are derived from
the sample frequencies of the combinations.90
Figure 7 -- Autocorrelations For Simulated Residuals
Order of Autocorrelation
Lines indicate a 95% confidence interval for the hypothesis that
r(j) = 0 for j³i where r() is the autocorrelation function and i
is the x-axis. The approximation used for computing these bounds
is






where r() is the sample autocorrelation function and T is the
















Figure 8 -- Partial Autocorrelations For Simulated
Residuals
Order of Partial Autocorrelation
Lines indicate a 95% confidence interval for the hypothesis that
fjj = 0 for j³i where f is the partial autocorrelation function
and i is the x-axis. The approximation used for computing these
bounds is
±2 SE(ˆ fii) @ ±2 1
T























Figure 9 -- Expected Change in Performance and




























Annual Supervision in Staff Weeks
* = Expected change in performance on a scale of -2 to 2 as a
function of supervision in the previous year in the first
half of the planned implementation period with all
explanatory variables at actual values.
= Expected change in performance on a scale of -2 to 2 as a
function of supervision in the previous year in the first
half of the planned implementation period for an average
project (time varying explanatory variables set to mean for
first half of the planned implementation period; time
invariant explanatory variables set to mean for all
projects).93






























Annual Supervision in Staff Weeks
Supervision level maintained for first three years of project
implementation. Calculation based on average project (time
varying explanatory variables set to sample mean for first half
of the planned implementation period; time invariant explanatory
variables set to sample mean for all projects).94
Figure 11 -- Marginal Benefit of Early Supervision
MBS
Annual Supervision in Staff Weeks
Marginal Benefit of early supervision estimated for an average
project (time varying explanatory variables set to sample mean
for first half of the planned implementation period; time
invariant explanatory variables set to sample mean for all
projects; cost stream assumed to be {.1, .25, .4, .1, .05, .05,
.05} in the first seven years; benefit stream assumed to be
constant for subsequent ten years; World Bank discount rate set
to 10 percent; supervision is in first year of implementation).